Directional mobility of debt ratings by Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Landon-Lane, John S.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comBorsa _Istanbul Review
Borsa _Istanbul Review 13 (2013) 67e78
http://www.elsevier.com/journals/borsa-istanbul-review/2214-8450Directional mobility of debt ratings*
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik a, John S. Landon-Lane b,*
aAston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, United Kingdom
bDept. of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton St, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, United StatesAbstractIn this paper we describe a method to decompose a well-known measure of debt ratings mobility into it’s directional components. We show,
using sovereign debt ratings as an example, that this directional decomposition allows us to better understand the underlying characteristics of
debt ratings migration and, for the case of the data set used, that the standard Markov chain model is not homogeneous in either the time or cross-
sectional dimensions. We find that the directional decomposition also allows us to sign the change in quality of debt over time and across sub-
groups of the population.
Copyright  2013, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
JEL classification: F34; G15; H63
Keywords: Ratings migration; Mobility; Sovereign debt
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Arguably, the widespread adoption of Basle norms for su-
pervision of banks and the rapid growth of the market for
credit derivatives are among the two most important de-
velopments in the world of banking and finance since the
abandonment of the Bretton Woods system in 1973. The Basle
norms, which came into force in nine of the G-10 countries in
1992, and have since been adopted by bank regulators in a
wide range of countries, initially penalized banks for risk
associated with their credit portfolios, by requiring them to
maintain a minimum amount of capital in proportion to the* We thank Moody’s Investors Service, and Kristin Lindow in particular, for
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disclaimers apply.
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nized the need to take into consideration market risk and
organizational risk as well, in the process of building a sound
banking system. Banks that are subjected to Basle II regula-
tions are required to undertake value-at-risk (VaR) exercises to
determine the extent of the market risk of their asset portfolio.
Over roughly the same time period, making a quantum leap
from a nascent market up until the middle of the nineties, the
size of the credit derivatives market exceeded USD 8 trillion at
the end of 2006. Credit default swaps accounted for roughly
50 percent of the market. Altman (1998) provides an excellent
discussion about the importance of understanding the patterns
of credit rating migration.
It is easily seen that the common thread linking the Basle
norms for banking regulation and the rapidly growing market
for credit derivatives is that both attach significant importance
to unfavorable events in the market. Changes in interest and
exchange rates, as well as equity and commodity prices can
adversely affect the value of a bank’s asset portfolio, and Basle
II aims to ensure, among other things, that the capital base of a
bank would be able to absorb an adverse movement in these
market prices without resorting to bail out and closure. The
contracts exchanged in the market for credit derivatives, on the
other hand, hinge on events that could either be defaults on ating by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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postponement of payment of interest. The likelihood of the
occurrence of an unfavorable event that can reduce the value
of an asset portfolio or trigger an event included in a credit
derivatives contract are, in turn, related to the phenomenon of
ratings migration. Banks and investors have to take into
consideration the probability of ratings downgrades (or, more
generally, changes) of securities (or their issuers) that are
either directly included in their portfolios or are underlying
assets for credit derivatives products of which they are a
counter-party. Specifically, they have to factor in the likeli-
hood of ratings downgrades (and upgrades) when they decide
on the prices of these securities and derivatives products, as
also the likely future needs for capital (in the case of a bank).
While there are several ways to model the likelihood of a
ratings migration, most of these models make use of as-
sumptions that are unrealistic (Albanese & Chen, 2006). For
example, Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997) postulate that the
likelihood of an upgrade and a downgrade are the same even
though it can be convincingly argued, for example, that the
likelihood of a sovereign rating downgrade is often higher for
developing countries while that of an upgrade is higher for
industrialized (or rapidly industrializing) countries. More
importantly, they compute a composite likelihood of ratings
migration that is not informative about the individual proba-
bilities of a downgrade and an upgrade. Yet, as we have argued
above, measures of these individual probabilities are important
both to compute an accurate VaR measure for an asset port-
folio and to accurately price a derivatives product that is
structured to protect against a movement in one direction,
namely, a default. In this paper, using sovereign ratings data
obtained from Moody’s Investors Service, for the 1996e2005
period, we address this relatively unexplored methodological
aspect of modeling ratings migration.
In this paper we use a time-homogeneous discrete-state
first-order Markov model to estimate credit migration (tran-
sition) matrices for sovereign debt ratings of various groups of
countries. We are interested in testing for differences in the
inferred migration matrices across different groups of coun-
tries and across different economic conditions. As in Jafry and
Schuermann (2004) we argue that the standard metrics that are
used to distinguish migration matrices (for example, the
mobility indices introduced by Shorrocks (1978) that are based
on the eigenvalues of the migration matrix) do not fully
describe the important characteristics of credit rating migra-
tion. Jafry and Schuermann (2004) argues that an important
characteristic of ratings migration is the size of the jump, i.e.,
a movement of two ratings classes in one period is different to
a movement of one ratings class in the same period. However,
like the mobility measures of Shorrocks (1978), the mobility
index suggested by Jafry and Schuermann (2004) does not
distinguish between upward movements and downward
movements in the ratings distribution. In this paper we use the
directional mobility measures introduced in Gang, Landon-
Lane, and Yun (2004) to test for differences in two migra-
tion matrices based on their implied directional mobility
thereby allowing us to fully characterize the directionalmobility of sovereign debt. We therefore get a better under-
standing of the underlying dynamics of sovereign debt
migration. In addition, we are able to estimate directional
mobility scores conditional on the initial ratings class of the
bonds. It is evident that these conditional measures of upward
and downward mobility of ratings have significant implica-
tions for two important sets of investors, namely, those who
invest in “cross-over” bonds and those that invest in high yield
bonds.
Bayesian methods are utilized in this paper which allow us
to generate exact finite sample tests of differences in sovereign
debt ratings migrations. The choice of sovereign ratings data
and the aforementioned time period enriches our analysis in
several ways. First, since the early nineties, a large number of
emerging markets (and corporate entities therein, whose rat-
ings are usually capped at the corresponding sovereign ratings)
have regularly accessed the global financial market to raise
funds. Our sample, therefore, includes a number of emerging
markets from Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin
America, thereby allowing us to compare and contrast not only
the likelihood of upward and downward mobility of ratings of
industrialized and emerging economies, but also those of
emerging economies belonging to different regions of the
world. Second, the time period of our data includes three
clearly identifiable adverse shocks that presumably had global
implications, namely, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian
default of 1998 and the Argentinean default of 2001. We are,
therefore, able to identify the impact of these crises on the
probabilities of upgrades and downgrades for each of the
directly affected regions, the corresponding probabilities of
other regions of emerging markets, and the probabilities
associated with the ratings of the developed countries that
were lenders to and investors in these regions. It is easily seen
that our data allows us to examine both the impact of country-
specific or regional events on the likelihood of ratings up-
grades and downgrades, and the nature and pattern of ratings
contagions. In other words, it offers us a scope to compre-
hensively demonstrate the advantages of our methodology.
We find that the time homogenous assumption is rejected for
our sample and our time period. We also show that the ratings
migration is not homogenous in the cross-sectional dimension
as well. As such, we are able to demonstrate that knowing the
directional mobility of sovereign debt ratings is important in
fully understanding the underlying dynamics of the debt ratings
migration. In some cases we find that the directional mobility
scores allow us to conclude that the ratings migration matrix
has changed between sub-periods where, otherwise, using only
the standard mobility measures we would have concluded that
there was no difference. We also show that the directional
mobility scores allow us to better explain the differences be-
tween different sub-groups of countries and between different
time periods. This, in turn, enables us to discuss the relative
change in the quality of the underlying debt directly from the
directional mobility scores that we could not do using the
standard overall mobility measures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the model and the estimation method and the directional
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migration matrices. Section 3 describes the data and the prior
distributions used in the analysis while Section 4 describes the
results. We use these results to demonstrate the importance of
separately estimating upward and downward mobility scores
for ratings migration and, correspondingly, the shortcoming of
an overall mobility score. Finally Section 5 concludes.
2. Method2.1. Brief review of the methodological literatureThe dynamics, and in particular the mobility, of sovereign
debt ratings is studied in this paper using a first order Markov
chain. The use of Markov-chain models to study mobility
has a long history with notable early contributions by
Champernowne (1953) and Prais (1955). More recently
Shorrocks (1976, 1978) discussed the Markov assumption with
reference to measuring income mobility and introduced mea-
sures of mobility that were functions of the estimated migra-
tion (transition) matrices.
A number of papers have also applied Markov models to
studying credit rating migration in the literature. These papers
have concentrated on a number of issues, and, in our paper, we
have addressed all the methodological concerns raised in the
course of earlier research. To begin with, there is a discussion in
the literature about whether the time-homogeneity assumption
is valid for the case of bond rating migration. Authors such as
Bangia, Diebold, Kronimus, Schagen, and Schuermann (2002),
Nickell, Perraudin, and Varottoa (2000) and Wei (2003) argue
that we should condition on macroeconomic factors such as the
business cycle when estimating credit migration matrices, that
the migration matrices are sensitive to the underlying economic
conditions. In the empirical part of this paper, we control for
changing macroeconomic conditions by breaking our sample
into three sub-samples, namely, a period of the Asian and
Russian crises of the late 1990’s, a period of recovery in these
regions of the world and simultaneously a crisis in Latin
America, and finally a period free of crises and yet one fraught
with uncertainty about rising energy prices and sustainability of
growth in the United States.
Other approaches to relaxing the time homogeneity of the
Markov model include Frydman and Kadam (2004) which
takes into account the age of the bond. They argue the rela-
tively young bonds face different probabilities of migration
than older bonds and show that a model that takes this
into account yields statistically and economically different
estimates of credit migration probabilities than the standard
time-homogeneous first order discrete state Markov model.
However, their results also show that for bonds that have been
in existence for longer than four years, the estimates of the
ratings migration probabilities for their approach is almost
identical to those estimated from the standard Markov model.
Given our data are on sovereign bonds that have been rated for
many years prior to 1996, the first year in our sample period,
we think that the results we report in this paper do not suffer
from the problem discussed in Frydman and Kadam (2004).Frydman and Schuermann (2004) relax the homogeneity
assumption by estimating a random mixture Markov model
where the probability of transition is modeled by two credit
migration matrices. Each bond’s ratings migration probability
has a positive probability of being described by each of the two
migration matrices. They show that this random mixture model
statistically dominates the standard model for corporate bonds.
In keeping with the spirit of this line of reasoning, in this paper,
we account for the possibility that different bonds could face
different migration probabilities by separating the sovereign
bonds into sub-groups based on country characteristics.
Finally, recent work by Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007)
show that for sovereign debt, downgrades and upgrades
should be treated differently. As mentioned earlier, this is the
focus of our paper. We estimate a discrete-state first order
Markov model with the aim of testing for differences in up-
ward and downward ratings mobility for different groups of
countries during different time-periods of recent history.2.2. Markov chains and ratings migrationOne of the most appealing aspects of using a Markov-chain
to model ratings dynamics across individual countries is the
ability to investigate issues such as differences in ratings
mobility over time, among subgroups of the population. The
Markov assumption is a natural way of thinking about ratings
dynamics while imposing only minimal theoretical structure
on the dynamics of the system.
The first order discrete-state Markov model is as follows:
Let there be C ratings classifications where C is a finite
number. Let pt ¼ (p1t,.,pCt)0 be the distribution across the C
classes where pkt is the proportion of the total population that
is in class k at time t. Therefore the variable pt defines the
“state” of the world at time t. The first-order Markov
assumption implies that the state of the world today is only
dependent on pt1. That is,
P

pt
pt1;pt2;.;ptj¼ Pðptjpt1Þc j ¼ 2;3;.; ð1Þ
where P(.) represents the conditional probability distribution
of p. Define the probability of transiting (migrating) from
class i in period t1 to class j in period t to be
P(pt ¼ jjpt1 ¼ i)hpij so that the Markov transition
(migration) matrix, P, can be defined as P ¼ [pij]. Then the
first order Markov chain model is
p0t ¼ p0t1P: ð2Þ
The initial income distribution is p0 and it is simple to
show that p0t ¼ p00Pt.
This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate and make in-
ferences from the Markov chain model outlined above. One
important consequence of using Bayesian methods is that it is
simple to characterize the exact finite sample properties of the
distribution of any function of the primal parameters,p0 and P, of
the model. For example, we are able to characterize the distribu-
tion of various mobility indices such as the probability of moving
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indices that we are interested in can be found in Section 2.3 below.
Before discussing in detail the measure of mobility and the
tests used in this paper we first discuss our sampling scheme.
We observe N countries over T time periods and place them
into C classifications. Let i˛{1,2,.,C}, n˛{1,2,.,N}, and let
t˛{1,2,.,T}. For each country, n, definednit ¼

1 if country n is in class i for time period t
0 else
: ð3Þ
For each country, n, and for each time period t we observe
the country’s sovereign debt ratings class snt˛{1,2,3,.,C}.
Let SNT ¼ ffsntgNn¼1g
T
t¼1 be the information set at time T.
Define kj0 ¼
PN
n¼1 dnj0 as the number of countries that are in
class j in the initial period and define kij ¼PN
n¼1
PT
t¼1 dniðt1Þdnjt as the total number of transitions from
class i in time period t1 to class j in time period t across all
time periods. The matrix K ¼ ½kij will be referred to as the
data transition matrix. Note that if T > 2 it is implicitly
assumed that P is the same for all T1 transition periods.
The data density, or likelihood function, for the model
defined in (2) ispðSNT jp0;PÞf
YC
i¼1
pki0i0
YC
j¼1
p
kij
ij ð4Þwhich is the Kernel of the product of two independent
multivariate Dirichlet (Beta) distributions. Natural conjugate
priors for p0 and P are also independent Dirichlet distributions
defined aspðp0Þ ¼
2
6664
G
PC
i¼1 ai0

YC
i¼1
Gðai0Þ
3
7775
YC
i¼1
p
ðai01Þ
i0 ð5Þand1 See Geweke et al. (1986) for a complete discussion on the properties of
these mobility indices.pðPÞ ¼
YC
i¼1
2
66664
G
 PC
j¼1 aij
!
YC
j¼1
G

aij

3
77775
YC
j¼1
p
ðaij1Þ
ij : ð6Þ
Here the priors are parameterized by the vector
a0 ¼ (a10,.,aC0)0 and A ¼ [aij]. Assuming that the priors are
independent then the posterior distribution for (2) ispðp0;PjSNTÞf
2
6664
G
PC
i¼1 ai0

YC
i¼1
Gðai0Þ
3
7775
YC
i¼1
p
ðki0þai01Þ
i0
YC
i¼1
8>>><
>>:

2
66664
G
 PC
j¼1 aij
!
YC
j¼1
G

aij

3
77775
YC
j¼1
p
ðkijþaij1Þ
ij
9>>=
>>>;
: ð7Þ
The joint posterior density Kernel in (7) is the Kernel for
the product of two Dirichlet distributions. The posterior
distribution for p0, the initial income distribution, is Dirichlet
with parameters (k10 þ a10,.,kC0þaC0)0. The posterior dis-
tribution for P is the product of C independent Dirichlet
distributions with parameters (ki1 þ ai1,.,kiCþaiC)0 for
i ¼ 1,.,C (Geweke, 2005). This posterior distribution is
simple to draw directly from so in this instance no Markov
chain Monte Carlo procedure is needed to make draws from
the (7). In fact is a simple matter to make identical and in-
dependent draws from these independent Dirichlet distribu-
tions using the method described in Devroye (1986). Once
we have these i.i.d draws from the posterior we can then
characterize the exact finite sample distribution of any
function of the parameters (p0 and A) of the model. Exam-
ples of such functions include the measures of overall
mobility and measures of directional mobility, which we
define in Section 2.3.2.3. Mobility measuresThere are many measures of overall mobility that can be
defined. For a complete discussion of the properties and def-
initions of a large number of mobility measures see Shorrocks
(1978) and Geweke, Marshall, and Zarkin (1986). In this paper
we report the mobility measure due to Shorrocks (1978),
MsðPÞ ¼ C trðPÞ
C 1 ; ð8Þ
which is the inverse of the harmonicmean of the expected length
of stay in a ratings class, scaled by a factor of C/(C1). This
index satisfies the monotonicity, immobility and strong immo-
bility persistence criteria and hence are internally consistent.1
This measure of mobility measures overall mobility and treats
movements to higher ratings classes equally with movements to
lower ratings classes. We also report conditional mobility
measures due to Prais (1955) which report the probability of
moving conditional on the initial classification. This conditional
measure of mobility is defined as
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XC
k¼1;ksj
pjk; ð9Þ
for j ¼ 1,.,C.
In the case of bond ratings, movements up the rating dis-
tribution have quite different implications to movements down
the ratings distribution. Hence we would like to distinguish
between the two types of mobility. To do that we use direc-
tional mobility measures proposed in Gang et al. (2004).
Aggregate measures of upward and downward mobility are
MU ¼ ðC 1Þ1
XC1
j¼1
MUðjÞ; ð10Þ
and
MD ¼ ðC 1Þ1
XC
j¼2
MDðjÞ: ð11Þ
Gang et al. (2004) show that Shorrocks’ measure can be
decomposed into its upward and downward components. That
is, MS ¼ MU þMD and that these directional mobility
measures satisfy directional equivalents of the monotonicity,
immobility and strong immobility persistence criterions.
That is, for any transition probability matrix (ratings
migration matrix), P1,MUðP1Þ  0, with the inequality being
strict if there are any non-zero elements in the upper-
triangular part of P1.
2 Thus the upward mobility measure is
positive if there is any probability that a bond will be
upgraded to a higher ratings class. Similarly, MD  0, with
the inequality being strict if there are any non-zero elements
in the lower triangular part of P1: the downward mobility
measure is positive only if there is a positive probability that a
bond will be downgraded to a lower ratings class. Finally,
monotonicity implies that for two different ratings migration
matrices, P1 and P2, MUðP1Þ > MUðP2Þ implies that the
ratings migration matrix, P1 represents a process that has
more upward mobility than the ratings migration process
represented by the matrix P2. Similarly, MDðP1Þ > MDðP2Þ
would imply that the ratings migration process represented by
the ratings migration matrix P1 would have more downward
mobility than the ratings migration process represented by P2.
The second set of directional indices report the probability
of moving up or down the distribution conditional on the
current class. These indices are:
MUðjÞ ¼
XM
k¼jþ1
pjk ð12Þ
and2 The term “ratings migration matrix” is used extensively in the ratings
migration literature and is just the transition probability matrix referred to
above. The two terms are used interchangeably in this paper.MDðjÞ ¼
Xj1
k¼1
pjk: ð13Þ
These two indices describe the probability of moving to a
higher (lower) classification in the next period given the state
is in classification j this period. It can also be shown that
MpðjÞ ¼ MUðjÞ þMDðjÞ for j ¼ 1,.,C and that these
directional mobility indices satisfy the directional persistence
criteria of Geweke et al. (1986).3. Data and priors3.1. DataThe data are obtained from various issues of Sovereign
Ratings List published by Moody’s Investors Service
(henceforth Moody’s). We select countries for which a
reasonably long time series data for ratings on foreign cur-
rency denominated long term bonds are available. This se-
lection criterion results in a final sample of 92 countries. Of
these, 13 are classified as Asian countries, 21 as Latin
American countries, 16 as Transition countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (including former Soviet Republics), 23 are
OECD countries, and 19 as other.3 As discussed elsewhere in
this paper, much of our analysis will focus on the comparison
of three of these (broadly speaking) geographical groups of
countries, namely, Asian countries, Latin American coun-
tries, and Transition countries. The industrialized OECD
countries act as a benchmark, while other is a residual
category that is too heterogenous to support any meaningful
analysis.
It should be noted that our classification does not adhere
to geographical locations and official nomenclature alone,
and takes into consideration the relative similarity of the
countries with respect to structure and macroeconomic sta-
bility of their economies. For example, even though the
Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia are Asian
countries, as oil producing countries they are structurally
different from other Asian countries like China, India and
Thailand. Hence, all oil-producing West Asian countries are
classified as other. Similarly, even though countries like
Turkey and the Czech Republic are OECD member coun-
tries, the structure and macroeconomic stability their econ-
omies are, in general, not comparable with industrialized
countries like the United States and Japan. They were
certainly not comparable with an average OECD country in
1996, the starting point of our analysis. Hence, while the
Central and Eastern European members of the OECD com-
munity have been classified under Transition, Turkey has
been included in the other category along with the West3 Note that we do not have an African country-category; all the African
countries in our sample are part of the other category. It was difficult to create
a separate African group with just five countries because of the computational
problems associated with a large number of empty cells in the transition
matrix.
Table 1
Countries in our Sample.
Asia Latin America Transition
China Argentina Bulgaria
Hong Kong Bolivia Croatia
India Brazil Czech Republic
Indonesia Chile Estonia
Japan Colombia Hungary
Korea Costa Rica Kazakhstan
Malaysia Cuba Latvia
Pakistan Dominican Republic Lithuania
Philippines Ecuador Moldova
Singapore El Salvador Poland
Taiwan Guatemala Romania
Thailand Honduras Russia
Vietnam Jamaica Slovakia
Mexico Slovenia
Nicaragua Turkmenistan
Panama Ukraine
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
OECD Other
Australia Bahrain
Austria Botswana
Belgium Cyprus
Canada Egypt
Denmark Fiji
Finland Iran
France Israel
Germany Jordan
Greece Lebanon
Iceland Malta
Ireland Mauritius
Italy Morocco
Japan Oman
Mexico Papua New Guinea
Netherlands Qatar
New Zealand Saudi Arabia
Norway South Africa
Portugal Tunisia
Spain Turkey
Sweden U.A.E.
Switzerland
UK
USA
Table 2
Definition of ratings classes.
Class Lowest rating Highest rating 20-year cumulative
default rates
1 C Caa1 77.198e100.000
2 B3 B1 53.179e61.888
3 Ba3 Ba1 22.919e45.112
4 Baa3 Baa1 6.276e11.355
5 A3 A1 2.267e5.176
6 Aa3 Aa1 0.958e1.560
7 Aaa Aaa 0.190
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ported in Table 1.43.2. Ratings classificationsSince the model we use is a discrete state Markov chain, we
need to define the ratings classifications. Moody’s has devel-
oped a sophisticated ratings system that can attach one of
twenty one possible ratings to a sovereign long term foreign4 It should be noted that these classifications are not mutually exclusive. For
example, Japan is included in both the OECD grouping and the Asian
grouping as Japan well fits the description of both classifications. Similarly,
Mexico is included both in the OECD sample and the Latin American sample.currency bond. The Aaa rating indicates that the bond is of
exceptionally high credit worthiness and carries minimum
credit risk. The credit quality of the bonds decline as we move
down the rating scale; Aa rated bonds arguably have excellent
(but not exceptional) credit worthiness, A rated bonds have
good credit worthiness, and Baa rated bonds have adequate
credit worthiness. Baa3 is the lowest credit rating for an in-
vestment grade bond. Below the investment grade threshold,
credit worthiness declines in discrete steps from Ba3 to C.
Bonds with Ba ratings have questionable credit worthiness,
those with B have poor credit worthiness, and a rating of Caa
imply very poor credit worthiness. Credit risk is particularly
high for Caa3 through Caa1 rated bonds, and bonds that are
rated Ca and C are either actually in default or are in default
for all practical purposes.5
In our analysis, we attempt to strike a balance between the
information content of the ratings categories and the practical
problem of having classification bins with non-zero observa-
tions that is essential for the analysis. Our classifications are
reported in Table 2. We make the reasonable assumption that
the numeric part of all alphanumeric ratings, e.g., 3 for a Baa3
rating, are refinements of the (basic) alphabetical ratings (i.e.,
Baa). This simplifying assumption is consistent with the
classifications used by Altman (1998), and is also supported
by the cumulative 20-year default rates of bonds during the
1983e2006 period, which we report in table 6 It is easily seen
that the ranges of default rates are non-overlapping across our
ratings classes, such that our ratings classes are mutually
exclusive. Our only innovation is to merge the alphabetical
ratings categories Caa and C into class 1, essentially arguing
that there is not much difference between bonds that have very
high default probability and those that are actually in default.
This is consistent with the comparable cumulative default rates
of 73.48% and 78.46% for Caa2 (the median of the Caa
alphabetical category) and C rated bonds, respectively.3.3. PriorsWe define natural conjugate priors for the parameters p0
and P. In fact we define C þ 1 independent prior distributions5 For details about ratings classification and a discussion about the factors
that affect sovereign credit ratings, see Cantor and Packer (1996).
6 See Exhibit 26 of Corporate default and recovery rates, 1920e2006,
Moody’s Investors Service, February 2007.
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general form of the priors for p0 and for the jth row of P,
P( j ), is defined in (14),
ðp10;.;pC0ÞwDiMða0Þ
pj1;.;pjM

wDiMðAðjÞÞ j ¼ 1;.;M: ð14Þ
where DiM(a0) and DiM(A( j )) refer to a multivariate-Beta
(Dirichlet) of order M1 indexed by the parameter vector
a0 ¼ (a1,.,aM), and A( j ) ¼ (Aj1,.,AjM), respectively. The
multivariate-Beta distribution of order M1 has density
pðxjaÞ ¼
G
 PM
j¼1 aj
!
YM
j¼1
G

aj

YM
j¼1
x
ðaj1Þ
j ð15Þ
where aj > 0 for all j ¼ 1,.,M and x˛fx : xj > 0ðj ¼
1;.;MÞ;PMj¼1 xj ¼ 1g. The priors defined are therefore
indexed by the vector a0 and the matrix A. This prior has a
notional sample interpretation in that we can interpret the
values of a0 to be the observations from a notional data set
with a01 observations in the first ratings class, a02 observations
in the second ratings class and so on. This notional interpre-
tation is nice in the sense that the smaller are the values in a0
the less influence they have on the posterior distribution.
The prior in this context has two important uses. First, it
allows us to explicitly state our prior beliefs about the pa-
rameters of the model. Second, it allows us to “fill in” zero
elements of the data transition matrix, K. In our application,
with classification definitions given in Table 2, we do not
observe any transition from classification 1 to classification 7
in any single period. Hence, the data transition matrix, K, has
a zero in the 7th column of the 1st row. In the definition of the
Dirichlet distribution of order M1 given in (15) we see that
the parameter vector that indexes the distribution cannot
contain any zero elements. The posterior distribution, given in
(7), is the product of M þ 1 Dirichlet distribution where the
posterior of the jth row of P, P( j ), is indexed by AðjÞ þ KðjÞ,
the sum of the jth rows of A and. Thus, as long as the prior
parameter, A( j ), does not contain any 0’s, the posterior
parameter will not contain any zero elements.
The priors used in this paper are designed to reflect our
uncertainly over the parameters of the model. The first
parameter is the initial ratings distribution. The prior
chosen for this parameter is indexed by
a0 ¼ (0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1). Thus the prior initial distri-
bution is a uniform distribution in that each rating class is
equally likely in the prior. The fact that each value of a0 is
small reflects our desire to have the data drive the posterior
distribution. In a notional prior context the prior as stated
implies that the prior comes from a notional data set with only
0.1 “observations” in each ratings class. Thus every observa-
tion from the data set is weighted ten times as much as our
“observations” from the notional prior data set. The prior for P
is indexed by A. Each row of A refers to an independent priorfor the corresponding row of P. Each row of A was chosen so
that the probability of staying in the current ratings class is 3.5
times more likely than the probability of moving to
another class. For example the first row of A is
(0.21,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003,0.0003). This prior
places most of the prior probability on the main diagonal of P.
This prior yields a prior probability of not moving of 0.99 and
a combined prior probability of moving of 0.01 for each rat-
ings class. Again that numbers were chosen to be small rela-
tive to the number of observed transitions so that the
calculated posterior is driven mainly by the observed data. The
other nice consequence of this prior is that the prior represents
a notional data set where there is almost no change in the
ratings classes of the “observations”. This implies that the
posterior distribution of the mobility scores will be driven by
observed movements in actual debt ratings rather than move-
ments in debt ratings from the notional prior distribution.
4. Empirical results: overall vs. upward and downward
mobility scores
In this section we report mobility indices for our whole
sample of 92 countries and for various interesting sub-groups
of countries. We report mobility indices for transitions from
1996 to 2005, as well as for the sub-periods 1996e1999,
2000e2002, and 2002e2005. For each time period we report
the Shorrocks’ overall measure of mobility and the decom-
position of the Shorrocks measure into its directional com-
ponents. We also report the conditional (Prais) measures of
mobility for each ratings class together with it’s directional
decomposition.
Table 3 reports mobility indices for the full sample of
countries. The table is broken up into four sections, one for
each time period that we look at. Looking first at ratings
mobility of the full sample of countries, we see that the
mobility is similar for the full sample period (1996e2005) and
for the first two sub-periods of 1996e1999 and 1999e2002.
The overall mobility for the whole sample is 0.126 while for
the first two sub-periods it is 0.132 and 0.138 respectively.
Only for the last period (2002e2005) is there a significant
difference with the overall mobility significantly lower at 0.09.
However when we look at the directional mobility indices we
see that mobility during the sub-periods are quite different. For
the first sub-period (1996e1999) the downward mobility score
is higher than the upward mobility score suggesting that
countries were more likely to be downgraded during this
period than upgraded. This result turns around sharply during
the second period (1999e2002) where the upward mobility
score is ten times the downward mobility score. This suggests
that, whereas the period from 1996 to 1999 was a period of
financial stress, the period from 1999 to 2002 was a period of
recovery where countries who were downgraded earlier were
now upgraded.
The conditional (Prais) mobility scores provide deeper
insight into these ratings migration pattern. In the period from
1996 to 1999, most of the (downward) action takes place in
ratings classes 3, 4 and 5, i.e., those just below or just above
Table 3
Mobility measures: full sample.
Mobility measure 1996e2005 1996e99
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.126 (0.015) 0.088 (0.013) 0.038 (0.007) 0.132 (0.023) 0.054 (0.016) 0.079 (0.017)
Prais
Class 1 0.121 (0.056) 0.121 (0.056) e 0.003 (0.039) 0.003 (0.039) e
Class 2 0.134 (0.030) 0.074 (0.023) 0.060 (0.021) 0.131 (0.060) 0.065 (0.044) 0.066 (0.044)
Class 3 0.175 (0.032) 0.088 (0.023) 0.088 (0.024) 0.209 (0.055) 0.037 (0.026) 0.172 (0.050)
Class 4 0.126 (0.026) 0.084 (0.021) 0.042 (0.016) 0.104 (0.040) 0.034 (0.024) 0.069 (0.033)
Class 5 0.057 (0.023) 0.029 (0.016) 0.028 (0.016) 0.213 (0.081) 0.087 (0.060) 0.126 (0.066)
Class 6 0.134 (0.036) 0.134 (0.036) 0.000 (0.001) 0.097 (0.044) 0.097 (0.044) 0.000 (0.000)
Class 7 0.008 (0.009) e 0.008 (0.009) 0.037 (0.037) e 0.037 (0.037)
Mobility measure 1999e2002 2002e05
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.138 (0.024) 0.126 (0.024) 0.012 (0.006) 0.090 (0.019) 0.060 (0.016) 0.030 (0.010)
Prais
Class 1 0.139 (0.090) 0.139 (0.090) e 0.110 (0.068) 0.110 (0.068) e
Class 2 0.109 (0.042) 0.056 (0.032) 0.054 (0.028) 0.167 (0.052) 0.106 (0.043) 0.060 (0.033)
Class 3 0.146 (0.052) 0.146 (0.052) 0.000 (0.001) 0.159 (0.059) 0.080 (0.044) 0.080 (0.043)
Class 4 0.162 (0.047) 0.145 (0.045) 0.017 (0.017) 0.103 (0.045) 0.062 (0.036) 0.041 (0.027)
Class 5 0.035 (0.032) 0.034 (0.032) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 6 0.236 (0.069) 0.235 (0.069) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.005)
Class 7 0.000 (0.003) e 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) e 0.000 (0.001)
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mobility scores being significantly higher than the upward
scores. Thus it appears that the countries that were likely to be
downgraded were emerging markets as opposed to mature
industrialized economies. In addition, we see that the proba-
bility of moving out of the lowest ratings class is much lower
in the first period than the subsequent periods while the
probability of downgrade of Aa and Aaa rated bonds remained
roughly similar across time periods. This goes on to suggest
that it is the marginally investment grade and below invest-
ment grade countries that are driving the result.
We now divide the countries into their sub-categories in an
attempt to understand the results obtained for the group of
countries as a whole. First we look at the mobility scores for
the sub-group of Asian countries that are reported in Table 4.
Looking first at the full sample period (1996e2005), we see
that the overall mobility score for the Asian countries (0.180)
is higher than the overall mobility score for the full sample of
countries (0.126), suggesting that the former were experi-
enced more ratings migration during this period than the
sample countries as a whole. We also see that the overall
mobility for Asian countries is equally divided into upward
and downward mobility. By contrast, for the full sample of
countries upward mobility and downward mobility contrib-
uted roughly two-thirds and one-third of the overall score
respectively. The highest mobility occurs in ratings classes 3
and 4 and upward and downward mobility scores contribute
equally to the overall mobility of these ratings classes.
However when we break the sample into three distinct
time-periods a richer story emerges. In the first sub-period
(1996e1999), we see that there is more overall mobility for
the Asian countries (0.246) than the 1996e2005 average
(0.180) but that this mobility is almost entirely downwardmobility (0.229). The individual classes that suffer the biggest
mobility are classes 4, 5, and 7 with downward mobility scores
significantly higher than the average. In the second sub-period
(1999e2002) the direction of mobility is reversed. The overall
mobility is lower (0.119) compared to the first sub-period
(0.246). Further, the composition of the mobility during this
period is also quite different with almost all of the mobility
being upward mobility. The individual classes that have the
highest mobility in the second period are classes 3, 4, and 6
suggesting that many of the down-gradings that occurred in
the previous period were reversed in this period.
The last sub-period (2002e2005) has a very similar overall
mobility to the second sub-period (0.104), and the break-down
of this mobility is such that two-thirds of the overall mobility
is upward mobility and one-third of the overall mobility is
downward mobility. In other words, the ratings recovery of the
Asian countries continued into the new century, albeit at a
slower pace.
Another grouping of countries that faced economic crises
during the sample period are the Latin American countries.
The sovereign rating mobility scores for these countries are
reported in Table 5. For the full sample period (1996e2005),
as well as for the first two sub-periods, we see that the Latin
American countries have fairly low overall mobility, approx-
imately half of which is the contribution of each of upward
and downward mobility. The differences in the directional
mobility scores is not statistically significant for any of these
three time periods. This is in sharp contrast with the much
higher overall mobility scores for the Asian countries in the
first two sub-periods. As such, this implies that there was no
ratings contagion from the Asian countries to the Latin
American countries during 1996e1999 and, consequently, no
ratings rebound among the latter during 1999e2002 either.
Table 4
Mobility measures: Asian countries.
Mobility measure 1996e2005 1996e99
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.180 (0.043) 0.096 (0.034) 0.084 (0.027) 0.246 (0.064) 0.017 (0.016) 0.229 (0.064)
Prais
Class 1 0.193 (0.161) 0.193 (0.161) e 0.004 (0.040) 0.004 (0.040) e
Class 2 0.097 (0.063) 0.051 (0.047) 0.047 (0.046) 0.194 (0.158) 0.000 (0.004) 0.193 (0.158)
Class 3 0.273 (0.095) 0.136 (0.070) 0.137 (0.073) 0.274 (0.129) 0.096 (0.085) 0.178 (0.110)
Class 4 0.192 (0.084) 0.096 (0.064) 0.096 (0.062) 0.399 (0.202) 0.000 (0.006) 0.399 (0.202)
Class 5 0.115 (0.060) 0.000 (0.000) 0.115 (0.060) 0.281 (0.130) 0.000 (0.005) 0.281 (0.130)
Class 6 0.100 (0.066) 0.100 (0.066) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004)
Class 7 0.107 (0.096) e 0.107 (0.096) 0.324 (0.228) e 0.324 (0.228)
Mobility measure 1999e2002 2002e05
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.119 (0.048) 0.117 (0.047) 0.001 (0.010) 0.104 (0.042) 0.070 (0.037) 0.034 (0.028)
Prais
Class 1 0.260 (0.200) 0.260 (0.200) e 0.008 (0.061) 0.008 (0.061) e
Class 2 0.001 (0.008) 0.001 (0.008) 0.000 (0.000) 0.097 (0.088) 0.097 (0.088) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 3 0.129 (0.117) 0.128 (0.117) 0.001 (0.011) 0.405 (0.205) 0.205 (0.167) 0.200 (0.165)
Class 4 0.110 (0.097) 0.110 (0.097) 0.000 (0.002) 0.111 (0.097) 0.110 (0.097) 0.000 (0.008)
Class 5 0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.013) 0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.016) 0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.015)
Class 6 0.206 (0.123) 0.206 (0.123) 0.000 (0.005) 0.001 (0.013) 0.000 (0.007) 0.001 (0.012)
Class 7 0.007 (0.056) e 0.007 (0.056) 0.001 (0.007) e 0.001 (0.007)
7 With the sole exception of the countries in ratings class 2, sovereign debt
ratings almost always improved for Transition economies during this period.
The most amount of action for this period occurred for those countries that
were initially in either ratings class 3 or 4. They had identical probabilities of
moving to a higher ratings class of 0.374.
8 However, unlike in the second sub-period, where the majority of the
movement was from bonds that were rated in ratings classes 3, 4, and 5, the
majority of the movement in third sub-period (2002e2005) was in ratings
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gion across these two regions dominated by emerging markets
is that the ratings of most Latin American countries were low
to begin with, typically below the investment grade, and
hence, in the absence of catastrophic events, there was not
much scope significant further downgrade in 1996e1999.
Table 6 reports the posterior distribution of the initial distri-
bution of sovereign debt ratings for Latin American countries
for each starting period of our sub-samples. It is easily seen
that during both 1996 and 1999 more than 70% of these
countries had ratings below the investment grade.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis in Argentina
(2002e2005), the ratings mobility of Latin American coun-
tries more than doubled compared with the corresponding
number of 1999e2002, from 0.045 to 0.091. However, this
overall mobility score for 2002e2005 is not significantly
different from the 1996e1999 score of 0.077. Hence, in the
absence of the ability to decompose the overall score into
upward and downward mobility scores, it would seem that
ratings migration in Latin America for 1996e1999 and
1999e2002 are largely comparable. However, we can see that
while the upward mobility scores for these two periods are
almost identical, the downward mobility score for 2002e2005
(0.060) is 36% higher than the corresponding score for
1996e2002 (0.044). Once again, our results demonstrate the
need to be able to decompose overall ratings migration scores
into their upward and downward components.
Next, we concentrate on an interesting group of countries
that also went through a large amount of economic upheaval
during the sample period, namely, the Transition economies of
the former socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe,
and the former Soviet Republics. The mobility scores for these
countries are reported in Table 7.The overall mobility score for the Transition countries for
the entire 1996e2005 period (0.146) is comparable to that of
the Asian countries for the same time period (0.180). However,
while the upward mobility score of the former countries
(0.146) is about 40% higher than the downward score. By
contrast, the upward and downward mobility scores of the
Asian countries are roughly similar (0.096 and 0.084 respec-
tively). The contrast between the countries is even more stark
when we have to take a closer look at ratings migration within
the three sub-periods. In the first sub-period (1996e1999),
while the downward mobility scores for both Asian and
Transition countries are much higher than the respective up-
ward mobility scores, the downward mobility score of the
Asian countries (0.229) is nearly four times that of the Tran-
sition countries (0.062). Similarly, in the second sub-period
(1999e2002), the upward mobility score of the Transition
countries (0.207) is not just (nearly) ten times the downward
mobility score,7 it is also nearly double the upward mobility
score of the Asian countries (0.117). Finally, in the third sub-
period (2002e2005), while almost the entire mobility score
for the Transition countries (0.081) can be accounted for by
upward mobility (0.080),8 the downward mobility score for
the Asian countries (0.034) is about 50% of the upward
mobility score.class 2.
Table 5
Mobility measures: Latin American countries.
Mobility measure 1996e2005 1996e99
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.077 (0.021) 0.037 (0.014) 0.041 (0.016) 0.077 (0.031) 0.032 (0.020) 0.044 (0.024)
Prais
Class 1 0.087 (0.057) 0.087 (0.057) e 0.007 (0.066) 0.007 (0.066) e
Class 2 0.158 (0.047) 0.070 (0.032) 0.088 (0.037) 0.189 (0.093) 0.128 (0.078) 0.061 (0.058)
Class 3 0.138 (0.050) 0.059 (0.033) 0.079 (0.038) 0.168 (0.087) 0.056 (0.054) 0.112 (0.074)
Class 4 0.067 (0.037) 0.000 (0.001) 0.067 (0.037) 0.079 (0.071) 0.000 (0.002) 0.079 (0.071)
Class 5 0.005 (0.049) 0.002 (0.033) 0.003 (0.037) 0.005 (0.050) 0.002 (0.026) 0.003 (0.042)
Class 6 0.005 (0.048) 0.001 (0.030) 0.003 (0.038) 0.006 (0.054) 0.001 (0.027) 0.005 (0.047)
Class 7 0.005 (0.049) e 0.005 (0.049) 0.006 (0.059) e 0.006 (0.059)
Mobility measure 1999e2002 2002e05
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.045 (0.023) 0.025 (0.015) 0.020 (0.017) 0.091 (0.032) 0.031 (0.017) 0.060 (0.026)
Prais
Class 1 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) e 0.130 (0.083) 0.130 (0.083) e
Class 2 0.087 (0.057) 0.043 (0.040) 0.044 (0.043) 0.199 (0.088) 0.052 (0.049) 0.148 (0.077)
Class 3 0.103 (0.070) 0.103 (0.070) 0.000 (0.001) 0.134 (0.084) 0.000 (0.006) 0.134 (0.084)
Class 4 0.061 (0.056) 0.000 (0.001) 0.061 (0.056) 0.063 (0.058) 0.000 (0.003) 0.063 (0.058)
Class 5 0.006 (0.057) 0.002 (0.032) 0.004 (0.047) 0.006 (0.055) 0.003 (0.037) 0.004 (0.041)
Class 6 0.005 (0.047) 0.001 (0.011) 0.005 (0.046) 0.006 (0.048) 0.001 (0.015) 0.005 (0.045)
Class 7 0.005 (0.047) e 0.005 (0.047) 0.006 (0.056) e 0.006 (0.056)
Table 6
Posterior moments of initial ratings distribution: Latin American countries.
Year Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7
1996 0.0093 (0.0295) 0.3166 (0.1392) 0.4202 (0.1507) 0.2221 (0.1323) 0.0099 (0.0297) 0.0106 (0.0308) 0.0112 (0.0346)
1999 0.0947 (0.0589) 0.3757 (0.0989) 0.3260 (0.0943) 0.1882 (0.0794) 0.0055 (0.0176) 0.0051 (0.0147) 0.0048 (0.0150)
2002 0.1420 (0.0736) 0.3261 (0.0996) 0.2869 (0.0940) 0.2290 (0.0843) 0.0056 (0.0185) 0.0061 (0.0202) 0.0043 (0.0135)
9 Overall, it appears that the OECD sovereign debt ratings were not affected
by the economic crises in Asia and Latin America (except of course for those
countries that are also included in the Asian and Latin American groups).
Further, it appears that the sovereign debt ratings of the weaker OECD
countries have generally improved over time to the extent that there is now
very little ratings mobility in the sovereign debt ratings for these rich devel-
oped countries. Given that most of them were in ratings classes 5, 6 and 7 by
2002, the conditional likelihood of upward mobility was low, and these
countries were evidently able to deal with factors like rising commodity prices
without much of an adverse impact on their credit worthiness.
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separately, however, becomes most apparent when we
compare the mobility scores for the Latin American and the
Transition countries. In the first sub-period, the overall
mobility scores for Latin American countries (0.077) and the
Transition countries (0.063) are similar and the difference is
not statistically significant. However, while the upward and
downward mobility scores for the former countries for this
period are roughly the same (0.032 and 0.044 respectively),
downward mobility in Transition countries is mostly
accounted for by downward mobility (0.062). Similarly, in the
third sub-period, the overall mobility scores for these two
groups of countries are not much different, 0.091 for Latin
American countries and 0.081 for Transition countries.
However, while downward mobility accounts for about two-
thirds of this mobility in Latin America, upward mobility
accounts for nearly all of the mobility among the Transition
countries.
Finally we investigate the ratings mobility of the OECD
countries. These mobility scores are reported in Table 8. We
can see that the overall mobility score of 0.127 of these
industrialized countries for the full sample period
(1996e2005) is similar to those of the Transition economies
(0.146) and somewhat lower than that of the Asian countries
(0.180). As with the Transition countries, upward mobilityaccounts for most of this overall mobility score for the OECD
countries.9 However, while the downward mobility still ac-
counts for 28% of the overall mobility score of the Transition
economies, it accounts for less than 1% of the overall mobility
in the Transition countries. We can make a similar observation
about the contrasts between the OECD and Asian countries
during the first sub-period. In 1996e1999, the overall mobility
score of the Asian countries (0.246) is nearly the same as that
of the OECD countries (0.229). However, while downward
mobility accounts for 93% of the overall mobility score for the
former, it accounts for less than 1% of the mobility score for
the latter. Our results once again highlight the analytical
shortcomings of a single overall ratings mobility score, and the
importance of having separate estimates for upward and
downward mobility.
Table 7
Mobility measures: Transition countries.
Mobility measure 1996e2005 1996e99
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.146 (0.031) 0.104 (0.027) 0.041 (0.016) 0.063 (0.028) 0.001 (0.009) 0.062 (0.026)
Prais
Class 1 0.137 (0.116) 0.137 (0.116) e 0.006 (0.055) 0.006 (0.055) e
Class 2 0.186 (0.067) 0.124 (0.056) 0.062 (0.040) 0.001 (0.009) 0.001 (0.008) 0.000 (0.004)
Class 3 0.317 (0.091) 0.159 (0.074) 0.157 (0.072) 0.303 (0.126) 0.001 (0.006) 0.303 (0.126)
Class 4 0.197 (0.062) 0.173 (0.059) 0.024 (0.023) 0.057 (0.052) 0.000 (0.002) 0.056 (0.052)
Class 5 0.032 (0.030) 0.032 (0.030) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.012) 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.009)
Class 6 0.001 (0.011) 0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.010) 0.002 (0.040) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.040)
Class 7 0.005 (0.042) e 0.005 (0.042) 0.008 (0.066) e 0.008 (0.066)
Mobility measure 1999e2002 2002e05
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.229 (0.054) 0.207 (0.051) 0.023 (0.018) 0.081 (0.037) 0.080 (0.034) 0.001 (0.010)
Prais
Class 1 0.244 (0.190) 0.244 (0.190) e 0.001 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009) e
Class 2 0.247 (0.103) 0.123 (0.077) 0.125 (0.080) 0.224 (0.134) 0.224 (0.134) 0.000 (0.000)
Class 3 0.374 (0.161) 0.374 (0.161) 0.000 (0.002) 0.156 (0.130) 0.156 (0.130) 0.000 (0.007)
Class 4 0.374 (0.115) 0.374 (0.115) 0.000 (0.003) 0.098 (0.093) 0.098 (0.093) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 5 0.124 (0.106) 0.124 (0.106) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003)
Class 6 0.005 (0.046) 0.001 (0.023) 0.004 (0.040) 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.006)
Class 7 0.007 (0.064) e 0.007 (0.064) 0.006 (0.057) e 0.006 (0.057)
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for separate upward and downward mobility scores and,
correspondingly, the shortcoming of an overall mobility score
in painting an accurate picture about ratings migration pat-
terns, especially when the sample of countries (or bond is-
suers) is heterogeneous in nature. One final question that
remains is whether the upward and downward mobility scores
estimated using our algorithm are sensible as well. As dis-
cussed earlier in this paper, our estimates suggest the
following, among others: (a) A large number of Asian coun-
tries experienced ratings downgrade in the wake of the 1997
crisis, but their ratings bounced back shortly thereafter. (b)
The ratings of the Latin American countries, which were
largely non-investment grade to begin with, were not signifi-
cantly affected by the Asian crisis. However, these countries
did not benefit from the subsequent upward mobility in Asian
(and also Transition) countries. (c) The Transition economies,
which were anticipating accession to the European Union, and
the macroeconomic stability associated with the membership,
experienced continued ratings upgrade during much of the
period. (d) Countries in the ratings classes 2, 3 and 4 were
disproportionately more likely to experience downward rat-
ings mobility than their counterparts in the investment grade
categories. These results are consistent with the experiences of
the actual countries in our samples.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated a discrete-state first order
Markov chain model of (sovereign) debt ratings. We use data
on a large cross-section of countries over a ten year period to
estimate ratings migration matrices for the whole sample of
countries and for different sub-periods and sub-samples of thecountries. As in the existing literature we find that the
assumption that the debt ratings migration matrix is constant
across time is too strong of an assumption; the Markov chain
is not time-homogenous. We also find that the model is not
homogenous in the cross-sectional dimension; there are sig-
nificant differences between the ratings migration matrices for
different sub-groups of the countries in our sample.
While some of the conclusions of the non-homogeneity of the
basicMarkovmodel can bemade from standardmobility scores
alone we show that it is important to be able to decompose the
observed mobility into it’s directional components. We use an
existing decomposition of a well-known overall mobility score
and show that this decomposition allows us to better understand
the underlying dynamics of the debt ratings migration for the
countries in our sample. In particular, we show that in some
cases while the overall mobility scores between periods are
almost identical the directional mobility scores are starkly
different, both in a statistical sense and in an economic sense.We
also show that even when we observe different overall mobility
between either two time periods of two sub-groups of our
sample the directional mobility scores help us better explain
what exactly is different between the two samples or periods.
This allows us to better characterize the qualitative properties of
the different sub-groups of sovereign debt and allow us to
quantify and sign the change in the quality of the sovereign debt
over time and between sub-groups of the sample.
Our methodology also allows us to similarly decompose
conditional overall mobility scores, i.e., the mobility scores for
different ratings classes. Indeed, even if the sample size is
small such that some ratings classes have zero observations at
a given point in time, we can overcome the computational
problems by using priors for those ratings classes that are
arbitrarily close to (but not equal to) zero. At the same time,
Table 8
Mobility measures: OECD countries.
Mobility measure 1996e2005 1996e99
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.127 (0.044) 0.126 (0.044) 0.001 (0.002) 0.229 (0.049) 0.222 (0.048) 0.006 (0.007)
Prais
Class 1 0.006 (0.073) 0.006 (0.073) e 0.005 (0.066) 0.005 (0.066) e
Class 2 0.004 (0.054) 0.004 (0.053) 0.000 (0.007) 0.005 (0.060) 0.004 (0.058) 0.000 (0.012)
Class 3 0.233 (0.181) 0.232 (0.180) 0.000 (0.004) 0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.012) 0.000 (0.006)
Class 4 0.119 (0.103) 0.119 (0.103) 0.000 (0.001) 0.302 (0.221) 0.302 (0.221) 0.001 (0.010)
Class 5 0.238 (0.136) 0.238 (0.136) 0.000 (0.001) 0.905 (0.168) 0.905 (0.168) 0.000 (0.002)
Class 6 0.155 (0.042) 0.154 (0.042) 0.000 (0.000) 0.117 (0.054) 0.116 (0.054) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 7 0.008 (0.008) e 0.008 (0.008) 0.037 (0.037) e 0.037 (0.037)
Mobility measure 1999e2002 2002e05
Overall Upward Downward Overall Upward Downward
Shorrocks 0.184 (0.046) 0.184 (0.046) 0.000 (0.006) 0.002 (0.016) 0.002 (0.015) 0.000 (0.005)
Prais
Class 1 0.006 (0.074) 0.006 (0.074) e 0.003 (0.052) 0.003 (0.052) e
Class 2 0.005 (0.064) 0.004 (0.055) 0.001 (0.032) 0.006 (0.071) 0.005 (0.064) 0.001 (0.032)
Class 3 0.838 (0.246) 0.838 (0.247) 0.000 (0.008) 0.003 (0.044) 0.003 (0.043) 0.000 (0.006)
Class 4 0.001 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.008) 0.000 (0.008) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 5 0.001 (0.014) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 6 0.255 (0.083) 0.255 (0.083) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Class 7 0.000 (0.000) e 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) e 0.000 (0.000)
78 S.K. Bhaumik, J.S. Landon-Lane / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 67e78our methodology ensures that the posterior moments for the
ratings classes are generated almost entirely on the basis of the
data, with very little weights attached to the non-zero priors.
However, while we report the conditional mobility scores for
the full sample as well as the sub-samples, for all time periods,
in the interest of brevity, we do not full discuss those results,
which reinforce our main findings.References
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